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Duanjie Chen and Jack Mintz* 
As the federal and provincial governments look to create jobs and attract
business investment, productivity-enhanced business tax structures are in high
order. Tax structures that combine internationally competitive tax rates on
neutral tax bases foster long-term economic growth and generate sustainable
tax revenue. 
This report examines tax policy in Canada over the past few years, specifically
its impact on capital investment, labour and the cost of doing business across
provinces and industries. Suggestions for tax reform are provided.
* We wish to thank an anonymous referee and officials from the finance departments of
British Columbia, New Brunswick, Ontario, and Canada for detailed comments.
SUMMARY 
With a stronger desire among governments to raise more revenue and balance budgets, a
productivity-enhancing business tax structure is needed that combines low tax rates on neutral
tax bases and provides an economic environment conducive for long-term growth, which, in
turn, would help generate sustainable tax revenue.
Economic growth could be improved by reducing corporate and personal taxes on investment
and savings in favour of consumption taxes. Recent tax reforms in Ontario and British
Columbia, where retail sales taxes, with their heavy burden on business intermediate and
capital goods, were replaced with the harmonized sales tax, are milestones for growth
prospects in each province. 
A 3 percentage point reduction in the federal corporate income tax rate, scheduled for
implementation by 2012, will also contribute to growth and jobs.  The first 1.5 percent point
reduction already is in place as of January 1, 2011 so a further 1.5 percentage point cut is
remaining. The final reduction in 2012 would reduce the federal-provincial marginal effective
tax rate on capital to 18.3% and, in the long run, would increase Canada’s capital stock by
$30.6 billion and employment by about 100,000. 
Further gains could be achieved by making the tax system more neutral — removing special
preferences that favour some business activities over others. When the tax burden varies across
business activities and types of businesses, the allocation of capital is distorted since businesses
decisions are not solely based on economic criteria but instead influenced by differences in tax
burdens. A more a neutral corporate tax system can boost productivity by shifting capital
resources from less productive to more productive business activities.
Reducing the corporate income tax rate would particularly favour the services sector, which is
more highly taxed than the forestry or manufacturing sectors. It would also reduce the tax
support given to preferentially treated activities through accelerated depreciation. If
governments also broadened tax bases by removing accelerated depreciation, investment tax
credits, and other tax exemptions that favour certain industries over others, the corporate tax
would be more efficient and less distortive of capital allocation decisions, and would better
allow businesses to exercise their own judgment about how best to make economic gains from
their investments.
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INTRODUCTION
The Canadian economy weathered the worldwide financial turmoil and ensuing recession
relatively well.1 As the recovery continues on a bumpy road, Canada is facing new fiscal
challenges arising from recession-triggered government deficits, which vary from province to
province. With governments now wanting to raise more revenue and balance their budgets, a
productivity-enhancing business tax structure would combine low tax rates on neutral tax bases
and hence provide an economic environment conducive for long-term growth, which, in turn,
would help generate sustainable tax revenue.
Canadians should not be complacent about their tax system. Studies have repeatedly shown
that taxes on capital investment riddled with special preferences impose high costs on the
Canadian economy. The most cited study, by Baylor and Beauséjour,2 suggests that each extra
dollar of corporate income tax that is raised by rate increases causes an additional 37 cents in
economic costs, excluding the cost of distorting the asset mix of companies. Taxes on the
purchase of capital, as under provincial sales tax systems, impose an economic cost equal to
$1.29 for each dollar of tax revenue raised. Personal income taxes on capital income impose an
economic cost equal to $1.30, while payroll taxes impose an economic cost equal to 15 cents
on the dollar. Consumption taxes impose the least economic cost, at 13 cents on the dollar.
Although tax changes in the past six years undoubtedly have reduced the economic costs of
corporate and personal taxes, these are still significant, and added to them are compliance and
administrative costs that increase the burden of taxes still more. 
These economic cost estimates suggest that economic growth could be improved by reducing
corporate and personal taxes on investment and savings in favour of consumption taxes. Sales
tax reforms in Ontario and British Columbia — where the retail sales tax, with its heavy
burden on business intermediate and capital goods, was replaced by a harmonized sales tax
(HST) — are milestones for growth prospects in the two provinces. Reversing this step, as
there is growing pressure in British Columbia to undertake, would be investment killing and
would cause considerable harm to the British Columbia economy, including losses in
employment and hence an erosion of living standards.3
A 3 percentage point reduction in the federal corporate income tax rate, with the first half
already in place by January 1, 2011 and the remaining half to be to be implemented by January
1, 2012, also would contribute to growth and jobs — we estimate the last 1.5 percentage point
reduction in corporate tax rate would increase Canada’s capital stock by about $30 billion and
employment by about 100,000 jobs in the long run4 — and reduce the federal-provincial
marginal effective tax rate (METR) to 18.3%.5 The revenue loss accompanying a corporate rate
reduction would be relatively small if one takes into account the shifting by multinationals of   
1 See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Economic Surveys: Canada (Paris: OECD,
September 2010); available online at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/23/38/45950025.pdf. 
2 M. Baylor and L. Beauséjour, “Taxation and Economic Efficiency: Results from a Canadian CGE Model,” Working
Paper 2004-10 (Ottawa: Department of Finance, 2004).
3 See J. Mintz, “British Columbia’s Harmonized Sales Tax: A Giant Leap in the Province’s Tax Competitiveness,” SPP
Briefing Papers 3 (4, 2010).
4 See D. Chen and J. Mintz, “Canada’s Tax Competitiveness after a Decade of Reforms: Still an Unfinished Plan,”
SPP Briefing Papers 3 (5, 2010).
5 It takes time for capital to adjust to changes in tax policy. Within four years 62% of the adjustment takes place, and
within seven years most of the capital adjustment takes place (based on the University of Toronto Focus Model).
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profits to low-tax jurisdictions. Studies show that, in countries with relatively high corporate
income tax rates — such as Canada, where the combined federal-provincial rate in 2010 is
29.3% — governments lose little revenue when they reduce the corporate income tax rates.6
Further gains could be achieved by making the tax system more neutral — that is, by removing
special preferences that favour some business activities over others. When tax burdens vary
among business activities and types of businesses, capital tends to be allocated to activities that
earn lower rates of return on capital due to tax preferences. A more neutral corporate tax
system could boost productivity by shifting capital resources from less productive to more
productive business activities and by changing the choices businesses make about the
allocation of capital.7 Studies suggest gains of between 50 and 85 cents per dollar of corporate
income tax revenues, which would be in addition to the distortionary losses arising from the
discouragement of aggregate investment.8 A corporate income tax rate reduction would
particularly favour the services sector, which is more highly taxed than the forestry or
manufacturing sectors. It would also reduce the tax support given to preferentially treated
activities through accelerated depreciation. If governments also broadened tax bases by
removing accelerated depreciation, investment tax credits, and other tax exemptions that favour
certain business activities, the corporate tax would be more efficient and less distortive of
capital allocation decisions, and would better allow businesses to exercise their own judgment
about how best to make economic gains from their investments.
In this report, we analyse the impact of tax measures that took effect in 2010 relative to the
impact of tax policy over the past two years. We measure this impact by calculating marginal
effective tax rates on capital investment, work effort, and the cost of doing business in Canada,
by province and by industry. We also provide policy suggestions for future tax reform.
6 See, for example, Kimberly Clausing, “Corporate Tax Revenues in OECD Countries,” International Tax and Public
Finance 14 (2, 2007): 115-134; Jack Mintz, “2007 Tax Competitiveness Report: A Call for Comprehensive Tax
Reform,” C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 254 (Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute, September 2007); and Alex Brill,
“Corporate Tax Rates: Receipts and Distortions,” Tax Notes, 22 December, 2008.
7 Corporate taxes have higher economic costs related to the allocation of capital among assets than among industries;
see B. Hamilton, J. Mintz, and J. Whalley, “Decomposing the Welfare Costs of Capital Tax Distortions: The
Importance of Risk Assumptions,” NBER Working Paper 3628 (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic
Research, 1991), which finds that the intertemporal distortion caused by taxing aggregate investment is the most
significant economic cost in this analysis. “Static” economic costs are also important, however, especially with
respect to inter-asset distortions.
8 Jack Mintz , “Neutrality and the Effect of Capital Taxation on Economic Efficiency and Growth” (manuscript
prepared for Treasury, New Zealand, 2010). The inter-asset, inter-industry, and business organization distortions are
not captured in the Baylor-Beauséjour estimates of efficiency costs since their model focuses on intertemporal
distortions of capital in only one sector. Since models differ, estimates of the economic costs of taxing aggregate
investment will vary.
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TAXES ON CAPITAL INVESTMENT  
In looking at taxes on capital investment, we calculate the METR as the annualized value of
corporate income tax, capital tax, and sales tax paid on capital purchases as a share of the gross
rate of return on capital.9 We measure the METR on capital for medium and large corporations
for each of the ten provinces and in the forestry, manufacturing, construction, transportation,
communications, utilities, trade and business and household services sectors.10
In 2010, the tax burden on capital investment was sharply reduced, with the federal-provincial
METR dropping from 28% in 2009 to 20.5% in a single year (see Figure 1a and Table 2a). The
main reason for this improvement in tax competitiveness was the implementation in Ontario
and British Columbia of the harmonized sales tax (HST). Further income tax reduction already
planned by the federal and several provincial governments (summarized in Table 1) will see the
national METR on capital drop to 18.4% by 2013 (Table 2b).
TABLE 1: Federal and Provincial Corporate Income Tax Rates, 2010 and 2013
* The reduced rate is for manufacturing and processing businesses.
** This is the current legislated rate in New Brunswick; the new government recently indicated it will not reduce the
rate below 10%.
Sources: University of Calgary, The School of Public Policy, Tax and Economic Growth Program
9 Duanjie Chen 2000.  “The Marginal Effective Tax Rate: The Only One that Matters in Capital Allocation”.  C. D.
Howe Institute Backgrounder, August 22, 2000.
10 We omitted mining and oil and gas as these sectors need updating in the current model; the underlying theory and
methodology is reported in J. Mintz, Most Favoured Nation: Building a Framework for Smart Economic Policy,
Policy Study 36 (Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute, 2001). Note that, in our analysis, we assume that investment tax
credits — the Atlantic Investment Tax Credit and similar credits provided by Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island,
Quebec, Manitoba, and Saskatchewan — are fully applied against tax liability in the year at hand. Such preferential
tax treatment, however, does not benefit companies that are not paying sufficient taxes to claim the benefit. Such
credits, while of little tax benefit to business, distort investment decisions that would otherwise be solely determined
by the market.
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2010                                          2013
(%)
Canada 18.0 15.0
Newfoundland & Labrador 14.0/5.0*                               14.0/5.0*
Prince Edward Island 16.0 16.0
Nova Scotia 16.0 16.0
New Brunswick 11.0 8.0**
Quebec 11.9 11.9
Ontario 12.0/10.0* 10.0*
Manitoba 12.0 12.0
Saskatchewan 12.0 12.0/10.0*
Alberta 10.0 10.0
British Columbia 10.5 10.0
Federal Actions
The federal government is on track toward implementing a gradual but significant reduction in
the corporate income tax rate that began in 2000, when it was 29.12%, and will end in 2012 with
the rate at 15%. Ottawa also introduced, in the 2007 budget, a fast write-off for assets used in
manufacturing and processing activities. Intended as a temporary measure to help manufacturing
and processing sectors compete globally and meant to apply to capital investment in place before
2009, it has been extended twice to include investments made before 2012. Once the rate
reduction is fully implemented, and assuming an end to the targeted tax preference for
manufacturing and processing, the net effect of these reforms will reduce the overall METR on
capital by another percentage point by 2013. The manufacturing sector, however, which is more
favourably taxed than other industries, will face an increase in its METR on capital from 11.7%
to 13.8% (see Figure 1b and Tables 2a and 2b). Forestry will also be affected since manufactured
forest product industries will face a higher METR as well.
FIGURE 1a: The Marginal Effective Tax Rate on Capital Investment, Aggregate and by Province, 
Canada, 2008-2010 and 2013
FIGURE 1b: The Marginal Effective Tax Rate on Capital Investment, Aggregate and by Industry, 
Canada, 2008-2010 and 2013
Sources: Authors’ calculations
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TABLE 2a: The Marginal Effective Tax Rate on Capital Investment, by Industry and Province, 
Canada, 2010
Sources: University of Calgary, The School of Public Policy, Tax and Economic Growth Program
TABLE 2b: The Marginal Effective Tax Rate on Capital Investment, by Industry and Province, 
Projected for 2013
Sources: University of Calgary, The School of Public Policy, Tax and Economic Growth Program
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Canada 6.3 20.9 26.1 11.7 24.9 25.0 20.6 24.4 26.1 20.5
Newfoundland & Labrador -44.4 NA 26.4 -34.2 23.8 25.4 21.5 24.5 23.4 13.3
Prince Edward Island -71.6 NA 44.2 -51.1 39.7 38.2 35.7 49.0 43.5 30.1
Nova Scotia -108.1 25.2 29.9 -88.6 28.8 29.0 24.7 27.8 26.9 11.6
New Brunswick -36.3 19.8 24.1 -27.3 23.0 23.2 19.0 22.1 21.2 6.9
Quebec 2.4 22.4 26.7 7.3 25.9 26.1 20.9 24.7 27.8 19.4
Ontario 13.7 20.5 24.9 15.5 23.7 24.2 19.9 22.8 26.5 21.1
Manitoba 3.3 28.5 39.3 3.7 34.4 34.0 31.5 42.1 39.1 30.4
Saskatchewan 13.7 24.7 34.0 15.8 30.8 30.1 25.3 37.4 32.7 26.5
Alberta 14.2 19.0 23.2 17.3 22.1 22.4 18.6 21.0 20.4 19.5
British Columbia 14.4 19.5 23.6 16.3 22.8 23.0 18.1 21.4 24.4 20.3
FO
RE
ST
RY
EL
EC
TR
IC
AL
 P
OW
ER
,
GA
S 
& 
WA
TE
R
CO
NS
TR
UC
TIO
N
M
AN
UF
AC
TU
RI
NG
WH
OL
ES
AL
E T
RA
DE
RE
TA
IL 
TR
AD
E
TR
AN
SP
OR
TA
TIO
N
AN
D 
ST
OR
AG
E
CO
M
M
UN
IC
AT
IO
NS
OT
HE
R 
SE
RV
IC
ES
AG
GR
EG
AT
E
Canada 9.2 17.5 22.1 13.8 21.2 21.2 17.4 20.7 22.8 18.4
Newfoundland & Labrador -39.1 NA 23.7 -30.5 21.2 22.8 19.1 21.9 20.9 11.4
Prince Edward Island -59.9 NA 42.5 -44.4 37.8 36.2 33.7 47.7 42.0 28.7
Nova Scotia -99.0 21.4 25.8 -84.6 24.7 25.0 20.8 23.8 23.0 7.7
New Brunswick -34.6 15.3 18.8 -28.5 17.8 18.1 14.6 17.1 16.4 2.8
Quebec 6.3 18.3 22.2 9.7 21.5 21.7 16.8 20.3 24.0 17.1
Ontario 16.6 16.8 20.5 17.7 19.8 20.1 16.1 18.7 22.9 19.1
Manitoba 6.7 23.8 35.2 6.4 29.8 29.4 27.3 38.6 35.4 27.0
Saskatchewan 16.4 22.5 31.9 17.7 28.7 27.8 23.3 35.7 30.8 25.2
Alberta 16.9 16.7 20.5 18.8 19.5 19.8 16.3 18.5 18.0 18.0
British Columbia 16.5 16.8 20.5 17.9 19.8 20.0 15.5 18.5 21.9 18.4
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Provincial Actions
The boldest business tax reform in 2010 came from Ontario, which, on July 1, harmonized its
provincial sales tax with the goods and services tax (GST), phased in a corporate income tax
reduction, and accelerated the elimination of the provincial capital tax. This tax reform reduced
the METR on capital for Ontario by more than 12 percentage points from its 2009 level of
33.6% to 21% (Figure 1a and Table 2a) and contributed 5 percentage points to the drop in the
overall METR on capital in Canada from 2009 to 2010. 
British Columbia also harmonized its sales tax with the GST. In addition, the province has
reduced its corporate income tax rate to 10.5%. As a result, the METR on capital in British
Columbia fell by more than 9 percentage points from its 2009 level of 29.5%, contributing a
full percentage point to the decline in the Canada-wide METR on capital (see below for further
analysis of the province’s sales tax harmonization).
By 2018, when both Ontario and British Columbia complete their sales tax harmonization (by
phasing out restrictions on certain input tax credits), and factoring in their planned income tax
reduction over the next two years, the METR on capital in the two provinces will drop below
18%, which will also be the Canada-wide average by that times, assuming no other tax changes
occur beyond current government plans. 
Another province that has substantially reformed its corporate income tax recently is New
Brunswick. Having reduced its corporate income tax rate from 17% to 13% from 2000 to 2003,
New Brunswick initiated another sweeping tax reform plan in 2009, including a planned
reduction in its corporate income tax rate by 5 percentage points in four years. New Brunswick
has the lowest tax burden on capital investment in the country — taking into account the
federal Atlantic Investment Tax Credit (AITC) for manufacturing and processing assets — and
its METR on capital is just 7%. As in other Atlantic provinces, manufacturing and forestry
industries in New Brunswick benefit substantially from the AITC; in New Brunswick,
however, unlike in the other Atlantic provinces, tax competitiveness is mostly self-made. That
is, New Brunswick’s relatively low corporate income tax rate provides a substantial reduction
in the tax burden of the services sector relative to other provinces — indeed, unlike in the other
three Atlantic provinces, METRs on capital for the non-manufacturing sectors in New
Brunswick are all below the national average. New Brunswick’s tax competitiveness will be
further reinforced with an already legislated reduction of its corporate income tax rate to 8% —
which would be the lowest in the country according to current government plans. We hope
New Brunswick’s rate reduction proceeds as planned,11 and that federally provided investment
tax credits and preferences for manufacturing and processing investments are eliminated in a
coordinated manner. Such preferences serve only to harm New Brunswick’s productivity and
offset gains from its relatively favourable tax burden. 
Alberta also has implemented a low-rate, broad-based business tax structure over the past
decade, which has given it a significant tax advantage. The province offers few special
preferences, although in 2004 it introduced a 10% research and development tax credit targeted
at qualifying investments of less than $4 million. Alberta’s tax advantage will disappear by
2013, however, when other provinces will have caught up by eliminating capital taxes on non-
financial businesses, lowering corporate income tax rates, and harmonizing their sales taxes,
which will virtually eliminate taxes on capital goods purchases. 
11 New Brunswick’s new government indicated in the November 23, 2010, Speech from the Throne that it might not
reduce the corporate rate beyond 10% after 2011.
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In other provinces, however, tax reforms have been more timid. More specifically:
• Manitoba and Saskatchewan by 2013 will be much less competitive with respect to
taxes on capital investment compared to all provinces except Prince Edward Island.
Manitoba and Saskatchewan had, in recent years, reduced their general corporate
income tax rates from 17% to the current 12%. While Saskatchewan has a reduced
tax rate of 10% for manufacturing and processing businesses, it has no plans to
reduce its general tax rate; Manitoba has made further reductions in its tax rate
contingent on a balanced budget. Furthermore, both provinces so far have rejected
the idea of harmonizing their sales tax with the federal GST on the grounds that
doing so would increase the tax burden on consumers. While Manitoba’s rejection
sounded somewhat more tentative, Saskatchewan’s opposition is more forceful, and
leaves little likelihood of future action.12 Saskatchewan’s METR on capital is a
little lower than Manitoba’s since Manitoba has a higher retail sales tax rate (7%
versus 5% in Saskatchewan). 
• Newfoundland and Labrador, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island all maintain
relatively high corporate income tax rates for large and medium-sized companies,
ranging from 14% to 16%. Although the AITC substantially subsidizes
manufacturing and forestry industries in these provinces, as indicated by negative
METRs for these sectors,13 almost all the services sectors in all three provinces
bear higher tax burdens than the national average (see Table 2a). Moreover, Nova
Scotia’s new 10% investment tax credit for eligible manufacturing and processing
investment further worsens the tax distortion between the manufacturing and
service sectors in that province and, by extension, the Canada-wide inter-industry
tax distortion. 
• Quebec has one of the lower tax burdens on capital among the provinces, but also
an inefficient tax structure with an endless list of narrowly targeted tax preferences.
These include exemptions for qualifying companies in targeted sectors, tax credits
and preferential deductions and credits for manufacturing, processing investments
in specified regions and various activities (such as pig manure farming), and tax-
preferred zones and holidays. In recent years, Quebec has eliminated capital taxes
but increased its corporate income tax rate, while further extending the list of tax
incentives. In 2009, the province enhanced existing manufacturing and processing
investment tax credits with a higher credit and/or refundability based on conditions
such as investment in specified regions (the general credit rate remains 5%).
According to our simulation, given its relatively high corporate income tax rate of
11.9%, Quebec could eliminate just its 5% manufacturing investment tax credit to
achieve a 4 percentage point reduction in its corporate income tax rate without
affecting its overall METR on capital. Such a move could also preserve Quebec’s
tax competitiveness in manufacturing and processing relative to most provinces,
including Ontario.
12 Based on information drawn from the following two government websites: http://news.gov.mb.ca/ and
http://www.gov.sk.ca/.
13 A negative METR implies that investments in marginal projects generate tax losses and credits that would shelter non-
marginal investments from tax. If losses and credits cannot be used fully by being applied to other income, the negative
rate approaches zero (only zero if companies are not expected to pay taxes during the capital good’s useful life).
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THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF PROVINCIAL TAX COMPETITIVENESS 
The tax reforms undertaken by New Brunswick, Ontario, and British Columbia have changed
significantly the landscape of tax competitiveness among the ten provinces. Until 2009, the
provinces could be divided about equally into those with high tax burdens on capital and those
with substantially lower burdens. With British Columbia and Ontario moving to the the low-
burden camp in 2010, the low-tax provinces now account for more than 90% of the Canadian
economy, leaving only Manitoba (with a METR on capital of 30%), Prince Edward Island
(30%), and Saskatchewan (27%) in a far less tax-competitive position, not only within Canada
but also globally — even with planned reductions the corporate tax burden, Canada’s METR
on capital by 2013 will only be similar to the average of member countries of the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), at roughly 18%. 
Prince Edward Island provides the worst example. It holds fast to the highest corporate income
tax rate of all the provinces for large and medium companies (16%) and the highest sales tax
rate (10%),14 both of which also burden the province’s manufacturing and processing
industries; moreover, the sales tax on capital inputs also hurts small business. On the other
hand, Prince Edward Island provides its own investment tax credit for manufacturing and
processing industries. Our simulation indicates, however, that if the province were to reduce its
income tax rate to 10%, harmonize its sales tax with the GST, and eliminate its investment tax
credit, business would benefit more substantially than it does from the combined AITC and
provincial investment tax credits. The METR on capital in Prince Edward Island would drop
below 20%, or less than two-thirds of its current level.
Lingering Cross-industry Tax Distortions
Most fiscal economists have long agreed that “having low tax rates on broad bases is
preferable for minimizing distortions than the contrary.”15 The contrary case is a combination
of high tax rates on narrow tax bases that are full of targeted preferential tax treatments such as
investment tax credits and fast write-offs. In recent years, despite most Canadian governments’
persistent rate reduction, fast write-offs and investment tax credits for assisting only
manufacturing and processing businesses prevail. The approach of using tax measures to serve
industrial policy has evidently worsened inter-industry tax distortions. Our cross-industry
comparison of METRs on capital shows that the manufacturing (and forestry) industry is
consistently taxed less than other industries mainly owing to the preferential tax treatment
extended to manufacturing assets. The reduced income tax rate for manufacturing activities in
several provinces, including Ontario before 2013, also contributes to inter-industry tax
distortions.
14 Prince Edward Island applies its sales tax on prices after including the GST of 5%, making the effective sales tax rate
10.5%.
15 OECD, Economic Surveys: Canada, p. 8.
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Figure 2 illustrates how the METR on capital for manufacturing compares with that for a broad
range of services, including public utilities, construction, wholesale and retail trade,
transportation, communications, and other services. In 2006, the METR gap between
manufacturing and the services sector was only a little more than 3 percentage points, partly
helped by unification of the previous two-tier federal corporate income tax rates in the early
2000s. This gap widened suddenly in 2007 to more than 13 percentage points due to Ottawa’s
introduction of an accelerated depreciation rate for manufacturing and processing assets,
matched by provincial governments. (Also helping to lower the METR for manufacturing were
adjustments to capital cost allowances to better match economic depreciation rates, which in
our view were appropriate measures.) The gap widened again in 2008 with Quebec’s 5%
investment tax credit. Although the gap closed considerably in 2010, Nova Scotia’s 10%
investment tax credit, which took effect that year, offset the closing by more than half a
percentage point.
FIGURE 2: The Marginal Effective Tax Rate on Capital Investment, Manufacturing and Services Sectors, 
Canada, 2006-2010 and 2013
Source: Authors’ calculations.
The significant shrinking of the gap in 2010 was mainly the result of the sales tax
harmonization in Ontario and British Columbia, where the elimination of provincial sales taxes
on capital goods helped services industries more than manufacturing. For example, the
communications industry had long been the highest taxed among all industries before 2010.
Mainly owing to the sales tax harmonization in Ontario and British Columbia, the METR on
capital for the communications industry dropped 13 percentage points from 37.4% in 2009 to
24.4% in 2010 (Figure 1b). In contrast, the METR on capital for manufacturing dropped just
6 percentage points from 17.5% to 11.7% over the same period (Figures 1b and 2). In the
absence of harmonization, provincial tax administrations often provide more sales tax
exemptions for manufacturing and processing assets — another illustration that Canadian
governments often favour manufacturing industries more than a broad range of service
industries. 
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The extent to which the business tax structure currently distorts capital allocation decisions
across industries and assets can be measured by a so-called dispersion index.16 This measure
provides an indication as to how much the tax system impedes productivity as resources are
shifted to tax-favoured business activities that will earn a pre-tax rate of return to capital that is
lower than that earned by other sectors that tend to be more highly taxed. As effective tax rates
decline in aggregate, as in recent years, the differential treatment across industry and assets is
accentuated, since the variation in effective tax rates has an even greater impact on the
allocation of capital to the most productive uses.17 Our simulation shows that inter-asset
distortions matter more than inter-industry distortions (see Table 3), a result not inconsistent
with those of other economic studies.18 Overall, the index of dispersion has increased in recent
years, driven in part by the preferential treatment given to some business activities. In 2010,
the dispersion index again rose, but largely due to the decline of the average tax rate that year.
By 2013, the dispersion index should have declined due to the expiration of certain fast write-
offs for capital as well as federal and provincial corporate tax reductions.
TABLE 3: Dispersion Index (Coefficient of Variation) for Marginal Effective Tax Rates on Capital Investment, 
Canada, 2006-2013
Source: Authors’ calculations.
TAXES ON LABOUR
When workers put in extra hours of effort, the taxes that are deducted from their paycheques
have a significant effect on their incentive to work. Taxes that affect labour markets include
personal income, employer and employee payroll (net of benefits), sales, and excise taxes.
Empirical studies of labour taxes focus on both the incentive to work extra hours and
participation in the labour force. Taxes discourage people from working by making untaxed
leisure more attractive than money income. The most significant effects of taxes on workers’
incomes are on the labour decisions of secondary workers in the household (especially those
with children who become of school age) and on retirement decisions.19 Such taxes also affect
decisions by those who can make more flexible working arrangements, as in the case of the
self-employed, as well as the decision to invest in education by reducing the higher income
that a worker would otherwise receive by acquiring skills. 
16 The dispersion index is the coefficient of variation, which is the standard deviation of METRs divided by the average
METR.
17 For an analysis of the relationship of the coefficient of variation and the incremental economic cost of taxation per
dollar of revenue, see Mintz , “Neutrality and the Effect of Capital Taxation on Economic Efficiency and Growth.”
18 Hamilton, Mintz, and Whalley (“Decomposing the Welfare Costs of Capital Tax Distortions”) report the same
findings, in part due to the substitution of different inputs used in production.
19 See Institute of Fiscal Studies and James Mirrlees, Tax by Design (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
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2006             2007           2008             2009            2010            2013
(%)
Inter-industry 15.4 25.6 32.0 32.7 43.7 27.9
Inter-asset 27.8 36.4 45.6 46.8 51.4 35.4
Overall 26.6 39.1 48.2 49.3 59.6 40.8
In our analysis, the METR on labour income is the tax paid as a percentage of the pre-tax wage
paid by employers on the last hour of work, taking into account personal income, payroll, and
sales taxes that reduce employment income received by the worker.20 We use distributions of
earnings across industries to compute the average marginal tax rates and then aggregate the
total effect of all taxes on the last hour of work. This tax measure emphasizes the effect of
taxes on the decision to work extra hours as opposed to joining the workforce (the latter takes
into account the effect of the average tax rate on the decision to work).
Taxes also affect employment decisions to the extent that workers bargain for higher wages to
make up for lost income in the presence of taxation. Differential taxes across industries lead to
higher wage costs for businesses since companies must attract workers who could otherwise
work for better after-tax wages in other industries; studies suggest that 20-30% of labour taxes
are shifted forward.21 As well, taxes affect interprovincial migration: the decision to move from
one jurisdiction to another depends on a comparison of taxes paid on total income earned (the
average tax rate) as well as the benefits of government spending and the lifestyle amenities
available in each jurisdiction.22 Our measure of the METR is less relevant to the migration
decision for this reason. 
To the extent that the tax system is progressive — that is, where average tax rates are higher on
upper-income households than on low-income households — interprovincial migration is
affected. All else being the same and given a fixed supply of jobs, a province with a more
progressive tax system will encourage lower-income workers to migrate to it and high-income
workers to move to a lower-tax province.23 Migration then causes skilled wage levels to rise and
unskilled wages to fall in a province with more progressive income taxes. Provincial policies
that redistribute income through more progressive tax structures therefore can be undone by
migration to the extent that workers receive the same after-tax income across provinces. In
Canada, interprovincial migration is sensitive to taxes and subsidies, although much less so with
respect to the francophone population, which has a strong attachment to Quebec.24
The year 2010 was less eventful than 2009 in terms of tax reductions for labour. In 2009, the
federal government reduced the personal income tax burden by raising the basic personal
amount and the bottom two personal tax brackets by 7.5%. In 2010, few changes were made to
personal income taxes except in Newfoundland and Labrador, New Brunswick, and Ontario,25
where they were reduced. British Columbia also raised the basic personal amount substantially,
to the benefit of all its taxpayers. On the other hand, Nova Scotia added a fifth personal income
tax bracket with an added higher top tax rate (21%), replacing the previous surtax for high-
income earners. Nova Scotia also raised the harmonized sales tax by 2 percentage points,
which, in turn, raised the METR on labour by increasing prices of goods and services, reducing
the purchasing power of income.
20 Again, for the underlying theory and methodology, see Mintz, Most Favoured Nation.
21 Ibid.
22 Similarly, provincial labour taxes can be shifted forward more strongly if workers are willing to move from one
province to another to avoid paying higher taxes.
23 Alternatively, a skills-intensive firm might move from a province with higher taxes on high-income workers, thereby
bidding down their wages in the province to levels elsewhere, while an unskilled labour-intensive business might
move to a province with lower taxes on unskilled labour, thereby bidding up their wage levels. A more progressive
rate structure therefore might reduce pre-tax income differentials but at the cost of substituting low-paid for high-paid
jobs, thus reducing average incomes.
24 See K. Day, “Interprovincial Migration and Local Public Goods,” Canadian Journal of Economics 25 (1, 1992): 123-144.
25 Ontario reduced the low personal tax rate from 6.05% to 5.05% as part of its 2009 tax reform that included the
adoption of the HST.
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Overall, the main adjustment most government made to labour taxes was to index personal
income tax brackets to account for inflation. Note that personal income tax burdens still
increase with indexation if wages and salaries rise faster than inflation – taxpayers move up tax
brackets even with indexation – this is known as “bracket creep”.  At an extreme, Prince
Edward Island did not provide indexation for inflation. 
MARGINAL EFFECTIVE TAX RATES ON LABOUR BY PROVINCE
At the provincial level, the most significant change in the tax burden on labour in 2010
occurred in New Brunswick (see Figure 3), which is in the process of implementing a four-year
plan of tax relief and restructuring, begun in 2009, that by 2013 will shift from four
progressive tax rates ranging from 10.12% to 17.95% to a simpler structure with two rates,
9% and 12%. Moreover, New Brunswick was the only province to index its tax brackets and
most personal tax credits by 2% for 2010, matching the estimated annual increase in non-farm
employee earnings. As a result, the METR on labour in New Brunswick dropped by
1.4 percentage points from 2009 to 2010, indicating a rapidly shrinking gap between New
Brunswick’s tax on labour and that in the least-taxed provinces of Alberta, British Columbia,
and Saskatchewan. New Brunswick’s new government has indicated that it will not implement
further tax reductions after 2010 for 1300 individuals in the province who earn more than
$450,000.
FIGURE 3: The Marginal Effective Tax Rate on Labour, by Province, 2008-2010
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Newfoundland and Labrador has also reduced its personal income tax rate as part of a multi-
year plan. Following consecutive tax reductions over the past two years, in 2010 the province
again cut both the middle and top personal income tax rates by 0.3 and 2.2 percentage points,
respectively. By 2012, when the legislated tax reduction is completed, the three-tier personal
income tax rates will be reduced from 9.6, 15, and 17.3% in 2007 to 7.7, 12.5, and 13.3% —
a much flatter personal income tax structure that should attract more highly skilled
employment to the province. 
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British Columbia also increased the basic personal amount significantly, from $9,373 in 2009
to $11,000 in 2010, equivalent to a more than 17% increase in the basic tax credit for every
personal income taxpayer. This increase is a part of transitional package for harmonizing the
provincial sales tax with the GST.26 The province recognized that sales tax harmonization
would increase the net sales tax for consumers, and therefore it provided some personal tax
relief as compensation.27 The net effect of the sales tax harmonization, including the increase in
the basic personal amount, has been a 0.4 percentage point reduction in the METR on labour in
British Columbia. 
As mentioned, Ontario reduced the marginal tax rate for the lowest income bracket, but given
the growth in earnings, its overall METR on labour is little changed.
Except for the indexation of tax brackets and credits, no initiatives were taken in the other
provinces in 2010. Again, because general tax indexation is less than the increase in earnings
— a process known as “bracket creep” as people jump into higher tax brackets — the tax cost
for labour increased in most provinces, particularly in Saskatchewan and Alberta, where
average earnings increased around 4% annually. The exceptions are New Brunswick, British
Columbia, Ontario, and, to a lesser degree, Newfoundland and Labrador, all of which
introduced tax relief for labour in 2010. At the other end of the spectrum, Nova Scotia, owing
to its added top tax rate and increased sales tax rate, saw a 1 percentage point jump in its
marginal tax rate on labour, the most significant such increase among all the provinces. 
Overall, the provincial rankings of the METR on labour did not change from 2009 to 2010.
Alberta, with its rate of 39%, continued to have the lowest marginal tax burden on labour of all
the provinces. Uniquely, Alberta has had a flat tax of 10% on personal income since 2001, and
has a generous basic allowance ($16,825 in 2010) before applying the tax. Closely following
Alberta in terms of their METR on labour were British Columbia (42%), Saskatchewan (42%),
and New Brunswick (43%). In contrast, Quebec continued to be the highest-taxed province for
labour, with an METR of 51%, followed by Ontario (47%), Manitoba (47%), and the
remaining three Atlantic provinces.
Marginal Effective Tax Rates on Labour by Industry
In a progressive tax structure, labour taxes are higher for skilled-intensive industries and lower
for industries that tend to hire less-skilled workers. Taxes therefore can affect the allocation of
employment among industries by reducing the demand for certain types of workers (who bid
up wages to compensate for tax burdens) or exacerbating labour shortages if certain types of
workers are hard to find.
Because we measure the tax burden on labour by the METR, a cross-industry comparison is
affected by three factors: industrial variation in labour income, provincial variation in labour
taxation, and the provincial distribution of employment among industries. That is, for a given
industry, the lower the average labour earnings, the lower the METR on labour due to the
progressivity of the personal income tax structure; the higher the industry’s share in a province
that taxes labour relatively lightly, the lower the METR on labour for the industry, and vice versa. 
26 See British Columbia, Ministry of Finance and Corporate Relations, Budget and Fiscal Plan, 2010/11–2012/13
(Victoria, 2010); available online at http://www.bcbudget.gov.bc.ca/2010/bfp/2010_Budget_Fiscal_Plan.pdf.
27 The provincial sales tax has been expanded from goods to services thereby increasing prices.  However, this be offset
by price reduction industed by the elimation of sales taxes on business inputs in face of competition. 
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The positive relationship between earnings and the METR appears to be most striking for the
public utility industry and the retail sector, as shown in Figure 4. The public utility sector ranks
among the highest in labour earnings, which might explain its having the highest METR on
labour of all industries. In contrast, the retail sector ranks the lowest in average earnings,
followed by “other services” and transportation. Not surprisingly, these three sectors, in the
order of their ranking by earnings, are the lowest taxed among all industries.
FIGURE 4: The Marginal Effective Tax Rate on Labour, by Industry, Canada, 2008-2010
Source: Authors’ calculations.
But this straightforward link between the METR on labour and average earnings does not
appear to hold for many other industries. For example, the average of earnings in
manufacturing is only the fifth highest among the nine industries but its METR on labour of
47.8% is the second highest. This is because Quebec and Ontario, the two highest-taxed
provinces for labour, respectively account for 24% and 53% of manufacturing industry, as
measured by the provincial distribution of total labour earnings within the manufacturing
industry. That is, the heavy shares of manufacturing in the two most highly taxed provinces for
labour result in a higher tax burden on labour for manufacturing than for other industries. A
similar case also occurs, albeit to a lesser degree, in the forestry industry, which is relatively
heavily concentrated in Quebec and Ontario. An opposite example can be found in the
construction industry, where average earnings are the second highest while the tax burden
(45.3%) is the fourth lowest among all industries. This is because Alberta and British
Columbia, the two lowest-taxed provinces for labour, respectively account for 38% and 9% of
the construction industry, so that their joint impact is more than sufficient to offset the
combined impact of Quebec and Ontario (41%), which brings the METR for construction
below the national average. 
Overall, the public utility sector is the highest taxed for labour among all industries, followed
by manufacturing, communications, forestry, and wholesale trade. At the other end of the scale,
the retail sector’s labour is taxed lowest (largely due to much lower average earnings by
workers), followed by “other services,” transportation, and construction. 
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THE TAX BURDEN AND THE COST OF DOING BUSINESS
Taxes on labour and capital increase the cost of doing business. We estimate, by industry,
marginal effective tax rates on the cost of doing business for large companies by aggregating
the individual effective tax rates on capital and labour according to the relative shares of
capital and labour in the sector’s value added. We assume that taxes on capital fully increase
cost, since businesses cannot shift the burden of such taxes onto owners of capital who are able
to invest in international markets with better after-tax rates of return. Taxes on labour increase
business costs to the extent that such taxes are shifted forward in the form of higher wages —
the portion shifted forward is assumed to be 30%.
The tax burden on the cost of doing business in Canada has fallen consistently over the past
four years, from 24.8% in 2007 to 20.1% in 2010 (Figures 5a and 5b). This largely reflects the
reduction in the effective tax rate on capital over the period, especially in 2010. The nearly
3 percentage point drop from 2009 (22.9%) to 2010 (20.1%) in the national average METR on
the cost of doing business is mainly a result of sharp reductions in the tax burden on capital in
both Ontario and British Columbia. Among all provinces, only Saskatchewan saw its METR
rise slightly, due to a higher tax on labour (with little change in taxes on capital investments).
FIGURE 5a: The Marginal Effective Tax Rate on Business Costs, by Province, 2007-2010
FIGURE 5b: The Marginal Effective Tax Rate on Business Costs, by Industry, Canada, 2007-2010
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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The ranking of METRs on the cost of doing business by industry is a subtle combination of the
METR on capital (Table 2b) and that on labour (Figure 4). Our simulation shows that the
communications industry bears the highest combined tax burden as a share of its cost of doing
business, followed by the wholesale trade and “other services” sectors. At the other end of the
scale, the forestry and manufacturing industries are the lowest-taxed industries, mainly owing
to their very low METR on capital investment. 
A PROMISING PATH FOR TAX REFORM
The 2010 budgetary changes indicated a new stage in the future of tax reform in Canada. The
federal government still needs to reduce its corporate income tax rate to 15%, a critical
measure that we discuss in more detail below. Importantly, the largest and the third-largest
provincial economies, Ontario and British Columbia implemented corporate tax reductions and
sales tax harmonization that will improve their, and Canada’s, international competitiveness.
Unfortunately, Manitoba, Prince Edward Island, and Saskatchewan maintain a high tax burden
on capital as a result of their high provincial corporate income tax rates and their sales taxes on
capital purchases. Nova Scotia and Quebec also have relatively high corporate income tax
rates. We therefore support the federal government’s proposal that all provinces reduce their
corporate income tax rates to 10% by 2013.
On the other hand, Ontario and British Columbia continue to impose a higher tax burden on
workers, particularly skilled labour, than does Alberta. Indeed, both Ottawa and the provinces
need to pay more attention to the effect of tax reforms on labour markets. Among the smaller
provinces, New Brunswick has done more than most to simplify and reduce taxes on work
effort. Ottawa also should look at reforms that would reduce marginal tax rates, especially for
the most flexible parts of the labour market. Tax reductions for modest- and middle-income
Canadians would enable people to cope more easily with daily demands and a softer economy.
We also think a flatter rate structure for personal income taxation, as Alberta and New
Brunswick are implementing, is an approach that other provinces might follow, since they are
less able to redistribute income (due to migration) than is the federal government. As fiscal
economists widely believe, “taxes on income are usually worse for growth and employment
than taxes on consumption or property.”28
By 2013, Canada’s profile of marginal effective tax rates, based on the legislative intentions of
governments, will be 18.4% on capital, 45.2% on labour, and 19.4% on the cost of doing
business (Table 4). The inter-industry and inter-asset tax distortions for capital investment will
also decrease as the federal government ends the current fast write-off of manufacturing and
processing assets. In support of such change, we provide some further policy suggestions, based
on our simulations, aimed at producing an even more competitive tax system, one with fewer
tax distortions that lead to misallocation of capital among industries. Our simulations include:
• harmonizing the provincial sales tax with the GST in all provinces, to eliminate any indirect
tax on intermediate and capital goods and to reduce variability in the effective sales tax on
consumer goods; 
• eliminating targeted tax incentives such as the AITC and similar provincial investment tax
credits, to broaden the tax base for possible further tax rate reductions; and 
• reducing all provincial corporate income tax rates to 10%.
28 OECD, Economic Surveys: Canada, p. 8.
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We find that the combined result of these changes to business taxation would be to reduce our
current projection for the METR on capital in 2013 by another 0.5 of a percentage point, and to
reduce inter-industry and inter-asset tax distortions by 60%. If all the provinces were to adopt a
flat 10% personal income tax rate, the METR on labour would fall from 45% to 42%.
Implementing all of these proposed tax changes would reduce the METR on the cost of doing
business from 19.4% to 18.0%.
TABLE 4: Policy Simulations for 2013
* The increase in the METR dispersion index compared to the previous case is primarily attributable to the lower
average METR rather than the standard deviation, which is lower than the previous case.
The Economic Effect of the Federal Corporate Income Tax Rate
Tax reforms that encompass lower rates and a more neutral treatment of business activities
generate higher incomes or jobs. The recent improvement in Canada’s investment climate is
due in part to corporate tax reforms over the past decade that have led to lower METRs on
capital.29 As part of those reforms, the federal government has legislated a reduction in
federal rates by a further 3 percentage points by 2012 — half of this reduction took effect on
January 1, 2011. The opposition parties object to this rate reduction, arguing that the revenues
should be used for other priorities. We noted above, however, that the revenue cost of rate 
29 See Mark Parsons, “The Effect of Corporate Taxes on Canadian Investment: An Empirical Investigation,” Working
Paper 2008-01 (Ottawa: Department of Finance, 2008).
19
METR METR DISPERSION
(%)
I.  METR on capital
2006 36.2 26.6
2007 31.6 39.1
2008 28.9 48.2
2009 28.0 49.3*
2010 20.5 59.6*
Tax changes by 2013: announced
Federal corporate income tax reduction by 3 points 18.2 64.7*
Ending fast write-off for manufacturing and processing 
equipment and computers 19.4 40.0
Provincial corporate income tax reduction and
capital tax elimination 18.4 40.8*
Tax changes by 2013: assumed
Case A: Nationwide sales tax harmonization 16.7 42.4*
Case B = A + Elimination of all investment tax credits 18.4 22.5
Case C = B + 10 percent corporate rate in all provinces 17.9 22.6*
II.  METR on labour
The current estimation for 2013 45.2
Case D: 10 percent flat provincial personal income tax rate 42.4
III.  METR on cost
The current estimation for 2013 19.4
Case E = Case C + Case D 18.0
reductions is relatively small when a country’s corporate income tax rates are relatively high,
which is still the case in Canada — the  2010 federal-provincial rate of 29.3% was almost four
points higher than the OECD average.30 Multinational corporations will shift profits from a
country with a high corporate income tax rate to jurisdictions with lower tax rates using such
tax-planning techniques as transfer pricing and debt loading. Adding to these income-shifting
effects on revenues are personal and corporate tax revenue increases associated with
investment and employment gains. Overall, the 3 percentage point corporate rate reduction has
little, if any, revenue cost in the long run.
While the budgetary cost of the rate reduction is neglible, we find that the resulting increase in
capital investment and employment could be significant. Table 5 presents our estimates of the
effect of the remaining 1.5 percentage point reduction in the federal corporate rate from 16.5%
to 15% to take place January 1, 2012 on capital investment and jobs by province and
aggregated for Canada.31 We estimate that such a reduction in the federal corporate income tax
rate would increase capital stock by about $30 billion after a full adjustment takes place (at
least seven years) and that employment would increase by about 100,000. These estimates do
not take into account the productivity gains arising from having a more neutral corporate tax
system. Given the relatively insignificant anticipated revenue loss from a corporate rate
reduction, it is clear that the investment and employment benefits make a strong case in favour
of pursing this reform.
TABLE 5: Estimated Effect of a Reduction in the Federal Corporate Income Tax Rate from 16.5% to 15%
on Capital Investment and New Employment
Sources: Authors’ estimates based on Statistics Canada, CANSIM database, table 310002 for capital stock at the year-end
(2005-2009) and table 2820089 for monthly employment data (January 2009 to October 2010). 
30 Op cit supra note 6.
31 The estimates assume that a 10% reduction in the cost of capital increases capital stock by 7%. This is consistent
with conclusions reached by Parsons (“The Effect of Corporate Taxes on Canadian Investment”). It is further
assumed that employment demand will increase after taking into account some substitution of capital for
employment (according to a Cobb-Douglas production function with about 25% of the share of value added accruing
to capital). We have allowed for for differing capital-employment ratios by province.
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CAPITAL INVESTMENT                  NEW EMPLOYMENT
($ billions)                                     (hiring in ‘000s)
Canada 30.6 102.5
Newfoundland & Labrador 0.6 1.4
Prince Edward Island 0.1 0.4
Nova Scotia 0.8 3.3
New Brunswick 0.6 2.3
Quebec 5.5 24.0
Ontario 9.0 39.3
Manitoba 0.9 3.1
Saskatchewan 1.3 2.8
Alberta 8.3 12.2
British Columbia 3.4 13.7
About the Authors
Dr. Jack Mintz
The James S. & Barbara A. Palmer Chair in Public Policy
Jack M. Mintz was appointed the Palmer Chair in Public Policy at the University of Calgary in January 2008.
Widely published in the field of public economics, he was touted in a 2004 UK magazine publication as one of the world’s most
influential tax experts. He serves as an Associate Editor of International Tax and Public Finance and the Canadian Tax Journal,
and is a research fellow of CESifo, Munich, Germany, and the Centre for Business Taxation Institute, Oxford University. He is a
regular contributor to Canadian Business and the National Post, and has frequently published articles in other print media.
Dr. Mintz presently serves on several boards including Brookfield Asset Management, Imperial Oil Limited, Morneau Sobeco, and
Royal Ontario Museum. He was also appointed by the Federal Minister of Finance to the Economic Advisory Council to advise on
economic planning and served as research director for the Federal-Provincial Minister’s Working Group on Retirement Income
Research.  
Dr. Mintz held the position of Professor of Business Economics at the Rotman School of Business from 1989-2007 and
Department of Economics at Queen’s University, Kingston, 1978-1989.  He was a Visiting Professor, New York University Law
School, 2007; President and CEO of the C.D. Howe Institute from 1999-2006; Clifford Clark Visiting Economist at the
Department of Finance, Ottawa; Chair of the federal government’s Technical Committee on Business Taxation in 1996 and
1997; and Associate Dean (Academic) of the Faculty of Management, University of Toronto, 1993-1995.  He was founding Editor-
in-Chief of International Tax and Public Finance, published by Kluwer Academic Publishers from 1994-2001, and recently
chaired the Alberta Financial and Investment Policy Advisory Commission reporting to the Alberta Minister of Finance.
In 2002, Dr. Mintz’s book, Most Favored Nation: A Framework for Smart Economic Policy, was winner of the Purvis Prize for
best book in economic policy and runner-up for Donner Prize for best book in public policy. 
Dr. Mintz has consulted widely with the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development, the governments of Canada, Alberta, New Brunswick, Ontario, and Saskatchewan, and various
businesses and nonprofit organizations.
Dr. Duanjie Chen is a Research Fellow at The School of Public Policy, University of Calgary. Over the past two decades,
she served as a consultant to various international organizations, national government bodies, and business and
non-profit organizations. She has published numerous articles and papers in the area of public finance.
CONCLUSIONS 
Uninterrupted efforts by the federal and most provincial governments to enhance tax
competitiveness to attract capital investment have borne good results: Canada’s marginal
effective tax rate on capital dropped nearly 16 percentage points over the past five years. In
contrast, the marginal effective tax rate on labour during the same period hardly budged,
dropping by only 1 percentage point, and has hovered above 45% since 2008. 
Taxes continue to be a significant part of the cost of doing business: about 20% of additional
costs in 2010. Preferential treatment of capital costs for some forms of business activity has
sustained rather high inter-industry and inter-asset allocation distortions, thereby impairing
Canada’s productivity. 
Future tax reforms, therefore, should focus on lightening the tax burden on labour and
correcting inter-industry distortions in capital taxation, in addition to continuing the unfinished
business of reducing tax costs for capital investment. Given the revenue needs of governments,
tax reforms that shift from income to consumption should be a major objective without
impairing the fiscal performance of deficit-plagued governments.
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Kenneth J. Boessenkool | December 2010
ETHICAL RISKS OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES: THE CASE OF ETHANOL IN NORTH AMERICA
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/files/publicpolicy/BiofuelsJordaanfinal.pdf
S. M. Jordaan & M. C. Moore | December 2010
CANADA, THE G8, AND THE G20: A CANADIAN APPROACH TO SHAPING GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
IN A SHIFTING INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/files/publicpolicy/SMITH_finalfinal.pdf
Gordon S. Smith & Peter C. Heap | November 2010
DIFFERENTIATING CANADA: THE FUTURE OF THE CANADA-US RELATIONSHIP
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/files/publicpolicy/dobsonkuzmanovic%20online.pdf
Wendy Dobson & Diana Kuzmanovic | November 2010
EXPANDING CANADA PENSION PLAN RETIREMENT BENEFITS: ASSESSING BIG CPP PROPOSALS
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/files/publicpolicy/Kesselman%20CPP%20online.pdf
Jonathan R. Kesselman | October 2010 
SECURITIES REGULATION IN CANADA AT A CROSSROADS
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/files/publicpolicy/Lortie%20online.pdf 
Pierre Lortie | October 2010  
CANADA'S FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT CHALLENGE: REDUCING BARRIERS AND ENSURING A LEVEL
PLAYING FIELD IN FACE OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS AND STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/files/publicpolicy/mattkrzepkowski%20online2.pdf 
Matt Krzepkowski & Jack Mintz | October 2010
INCREASING THE AFFORDABILITY OF RENTAL HOUSING IN CANADA: AN ASSESSMENT OF ALTERNATIVE
SUPPLY-SIDE MEASURES 
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/files/publicpolicy/research_steeletomlinson_onlinefin2.pdf 
Marion Steele & Peter Tomlinson | September 2010
SHOULD GOVERNMENT FACILITATE VOLUNTARY PENSION PLANS?
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/files/publicpolicy/researchnielson.pdf
Norma L. Nielson | July 2010
CANADA’S TAX COMPETITIVENESS AFTER A DECADE OF REFORMS: STILL AN UNFINISHED PLAN
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/files/publicpolicy/TaxCorp.pdf 
Duanjie Chen & Jack Mintz | May 2010
BRITISH COLUMBIA'S HARMONIZED SALES TAX: A GIANT LEAP IN THE PROVINCE'S COMPETITIVENESS
http://www.policyschool.ucalgary.ca/files/publicpolicy/bctaxonline.pdf 
Jack Mintz | March 2010
TAXING CANADA’S CASH COW: TAX AND ROYALTY BURDENS ON OIL AND GAS INVESTMENTS
http://www.policyschool.ucalgary.ca/files/publicpolicy/cashcow1b.pdf 
Jack Mintz & Duanjie Chen| February 2010
DOES ALBERTA HAVE A SPENDING PROBLEM? 
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/files/publicpolicy/albsp2.pdf 
Ken Boessenkool | February 2010
REPLACING ALLOWANCES FOR CANADA’S NATIONAL POLITICAL PARTIES?
http://www.policyschool.ucalgary.ca/files/publicpolicy/Flanagan%20&amp;%20Coletto%20ONLINE%203.pdf
Tom Flanagan and David Coletto | January 2010
